this, of course, is that it was Lipsius himself who laid the foundations for this shift when he made the first systematic attempt to gather together the fragments of the Stoics in a pair of sourcebooks published in 1604 and conceived as companion pieces to his edition of Seneca published the following year. 8 An equally important strand was the way in which Stoicism as a philosophical position was often brought into contemporary philosophical debates, especially those concerning determinism, fate and providence. At precisely the time that attention was shifting away from the high-minded morals of Epictetus and Seneca towards the physical doctrines of the early Stoa, the late seventeenth-century philosophical scene was coming to terms with the works of Hobbes and then Spinoza, who were, of course, to become the two great anti-heroes of the Enlightenment. 9 Before long both Hobbes and Spinoza were branded 'Stoics' by some of their contemporary critics, and so the fate of Stoicism became intertwined with the fates of Hobbism and (in particular) Spinozism.
It is precisely this sort of dialogue between the ancient and the modern that marks Ralph Cudworth's monumental True Intellectual System of the Universe, published in 1678. 10 This work deserves to stand alongside Hobbes's Leviathan and Locke's Essay as the third great work of seventeenth-century English philosophy. It has not received that accolade as widely as it might, no doubt in part due to its length (900 folio pages), but also due to its detailed and extensive (if not laborious and relentless) quotation from and discussion of a bewildering array of ancient philosophical texts, from the earliest Presocratics through to the last Neoplatonists. In his Thoughts Concerning Education, John Locke praised the True Intellectual System as a veri- writing, Cudworth harks back to the spirit of Renaissance Humanism. 13 The True Intellectual System was published roughly in the middle of the period during which Stoicism was transformed from theism to atheism (i.e. 1584-1765). It also contains what must be the most sustained discussion of Stoic theology from the early modern period. On the journey from theisim to atheism, then, Cudworth's discussion stands as a key moment in the reception of Stoicism.
THE TRUE INTELLECTUAL SYSTEM
Before turning to the details of Cudworth's account of Stoicism, it may be helpful to have a clearer idea of both his own philosophical outlook and the task that he set himself in the True Intellectual System. Cudworth was, of course, one of the Cambridge Platonists.
14 To describe him simply as a Platonist, however, does not begin to do justice to the complexities of his philosophy. A more accurate label might be Cartesian Neoplatonist, for it is the Neoplatonic tradition inaugurated by Plotinus that formed the central influence, combined with a commitment to Cartesian dualism. 15 Cudworth's own metaphysics comprises God, a mechanical atomistic nature, and, between the two, immaterial souls and an unconscious, animate 'plastic nature' that orders the inert physical world according to God's providence and emanates from Him in a Neoplatonic fashion. For Cudworth mechanical atomism need not undermine the immaterial soul or God; on the contrary such a philosophy requires such entities in order to explain the movement of inanimate matter, either as a first cause or in the form of more regular intervention.
As well as a commitment to the existence of God, Cudworth is equally committed to the objective existence of moral values and to freedom of the will. His philosophy is thus concerned with supporting these three claims and, as importantly, attacking their opposites, namely atheism, moral relativism and determinism. Cudworth's magnum opus, the True Intellectual System of the Universe, was conceived in three parts, each concerned with one of these key philosophical disputes: theism versus atheism, moral objectivism versus relativism and liberty versus necessity. 16 The book that was published under the title True Intellectual System in 1678 is, despite its length, only the first part of the projected work, and so subtitled The First Part Wherein all the Reason and Philosophy of Atheism is Confuted and its Impossibility Demonstrated. It was in fact the final part of his project, concerned with liberty and necessity, that Cudworth held to be most urgent, and so the analysis of atheism forms (in the words of Cassirer) 'a gigantic fragment' that 16 See Cudworth's Preface in True Intellectual System, as printed in Cudworth (1820), vol. 1, 47. was simply part of a preamble towards the main task. 17 In the opening lines of the Preface to the True Intellectual System, Cudworth confesses that 'when I engaged the press, I intended only a discourse concerning liberty and necessity, or, to speak out more plainly, against the fatal necessity of all actions and events'. 18 While atheism and moral relativism are naturally just as pernicious as determinism to Cudworth, he is primarily concerned about the rise of determinism, for it seems to him to lead on inevitably to the other two vices. Determinism, a doctrine sometimes thought to be compatible with Christian belief, in fact undermines our notions of praise and blame and so makes punishment, in the form of the day of judgement, redundant. Consequently, it undermines both our morality and our fear of God. It is for these reasons that the battle between liberty and necessity stands as Cudworth's principal philosophical concern.
Although Cudworth only published the first part and never issued the second and third parts that would have dealt with morality and liberty, he left behind a substantial number of manuscripts, extracts of which were published posthumously. Drafts of material destined for the second part were published in 1731 as A Treatise Concerning Eternal and Immutable Morality, while one of a number of manuscripts dealing with liberty and necessity now held in The British Library was published in 1838 as A Treatise of Freewill.
19 Therefore, although Cudworth never finished the True Intellectual System in the form that he intended, his three published philosophical works do give us a good sense of what it would have contained if it had been completed.
THE REFUTATION OF ATHEISM
In the work we know as the True Intellectual System, the task is to refute atheism. In order to deal with atheism, Cudworth's method is to gather together the various arguments for atheism that have been advanced throughout the history of philosophy and to refute them one by one. However, as a consummate scholar, this method demands that Cudworth supply all of the existing arguments for atheism, properly documented, before turning to refute them. Ironically, what we find in the True Intellectual System is arguably the finest history of philosophical atheism ever written, a veritable textbook of atheism. 20 In fact, some of his contemporaries came to a similar assessment, attacking him for stating the reasons in favour of atheism a little too clearly, as Shaftesbury noted in his attempt to defend Cudworth. There is no question, however, that Cudworth might have been some form of atheist in disguise. While we might question the strict orthodoxy of Cudworth's own theology, there is little doubt that he was a devoted Christian. His entire philosophical project is directed towards combating contemporary forms of atheism and especially philosophies that combined atheism with determinism. 22 His central target is probably Hobbes. 23 There is also a comment that might be taken as a reference to Spinoza, although he is not named. 24 It is not clear how familiar Cudworth was with Spinoza's philosophy. While the True Intellectual System was published a year after Spinoza's 1677 Opera Posthuma, the bulk of it was completed as early as 1671, but according to Nadler, parts of Spinoza's Ethica circulated in MS form as early as 1663 and a first draft was complete by 1665. 25 Here was arguably another contemporary atheist but one quite different from Hobbes. However, Cudworth does not name any of these contemporary opponents and instead embarks upon a philological excavation of ancient forms of atheism. Cudworth's view is that very few philosophical positions are completely new, and that every apparently novel philosophical idea usually has some ancestor. With this model of perennial philosophy in the background, Cudworth takes on all and sundry contemporary forms of atheism via a complex taxonomy of the very earliest expressions of atheism. If Cudworth can show that contemporary atheists merely reinvent doctrines proven to be false long ago, then his task is done.
Cudworth proceeds, then, to collate and categorize ancient forms of atheism and it is within this context that we find his discussion of Stoicism. This classification begins by identifying two principal forms of atheism. The most notorious of these is atomical atheism. However, Cudworth, the atomical theist, is keen to show that atomism is not only compatible with theism but also that atomistic atheism is in fact merely a corruption of an earlier form of atomistic theism.
The second principal form of atheism he calls hylozoical. While atomical atheism conceives matter as essentially inert, hylozoism attributes life to all matter as an essential property:
One main difference betwixt these two forms of atheism is this, that the Atomical supposes all life whatsoever to be accidental, generable, and corruptible: but the Hylozoick admits of a certain natural or plastick life, essential and substantial, ingenerable and incorruptible. 26 22 Cudworth holds that these two doctrines naturally belong together, stating that 'there can be nothing more absurd, than for an atheist to assert liberty of the will' (True Intellectual System, Preface (1678), fol. *v.; (1820), vol. 1, 52 (reading 'than' with the 1820 edition, in place of 'then' in the 1678 edition)). While atomical atheism is naturally associated with the name of Democritus, hylozoick atheism is credited first to Strato, a Peripatetic philosopher and student of Theophrastus.
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Cudworth's taxonomy of atheism does not end here, however. The distinction between 'Atomical' and 'Hylozoick' atheism is fundamentally a distinction between dead and living matter, but Cudworth goes on to argue that each of these broad categories contains within itself more than one type of atheism. The categories of 'Atomical' and 'Hylozoick' atheism are thus each subdivided to give us four principal types of atheism. To complicate matters a little, Cudworth carries over the labels 'Atomical' and 'Hylozoick' to two of these four subtypes. Now, alongside Atomical atheism stands another form of atheism built upon a conception of dead matter and alongside Hylozoic atheism stands another form involving the notion of living matter.
The first of these new types is Hylopathian or Anaximandrian atheism, after the Milesian Presocratic. Like Atomical or Democritical atheism, this new type assumes matter to be dead. The difference between the two is that while Atomical atheism derives things or objects from the arrangement of atoms, Hylopathian atheism does so via qualities and forms.
The second new type, the fourth and final type of atheism, Cudworth calls variously 'Spermatick' or 'Cosmo-Plastick' atheism and, like 'Hylozoick' atheism, it is built upon a conception of living matter. The difference between these two is that while 'Hylozoick' atheism attributes a life principle or force to each material entity, 'Spermatick' or 'Cosmo-Plastick' atheism posits just one living principle animating all of the corporeal world. This principle is, however, 'without any sense or conscious understanding'. 28 Cudworth illustrates this with a passage from Seneca's Natural Questions (to which we shall return later) and goes on to claim that 'we cannot trace the footsteps of this doctrine any where so much as among the Stoicks', and so he labels it Stoical atheism. 29 We shall come back to the details of Cudworth's reading of the Stoics shortly. By way of summary first, we now have four types of atheism, divided into two pairs according to their respective conceptions of matter, and each type associated with the name of an ancient philosopher or an ancient school. The 'Atomical', 'Hylopathian', 'Hylozoick' and 'Cosmo-Plastick', are associated with Democritus, Anaximander, Strato and the Stoics respectively. 30 What all these 27 The surviving evidence for Strato is collected together in F. forms of atheism share in common is corporealism; they admit no other substance beyond body or matter. Cudworth writes:
all atheists are possessed with a certain kind of madness, that may be called pneumatophobia, that makes them have an irrational but desperate abhorrence from spirits or incorporeal substance, they being acted also, at the same time, with an hylomania, whereby they madly dote upon matter, and devoutly worship it, as the only numen.
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In fact, perhaps the key characteristic of atheism for Cudworth is that: 'all animality, sense and consciousness, is a secondary, derivative and accidental thing, generable and corruptible, arising out of particular concretions of matter organized and dissolved together with them'. 32 The essence of atheism, then, is the claim that consciousness is an emergent property. As he puts it elsewhere, all forms of atheism share the claim that all conscious life (i.e. all souls and minds) is generated out of matter or 'educed out of nothing, and reduced into nothing'. 33 Theism, by contrast, places animal, sentient and conscious nature as the first principle of the universe, in the form of God.
The other characteristic that Cudworth attributes to all four types of atheism is a belief in the necessity of events (we have already seen that determinism is Cudworth's greatest concern), although he says that there are in fact two types of atheistic necessity. The Anaximandrians and Democritists posit a material necessity or absolute necessity, while the Stoics and Stratonists posit a plastic necessity or hypothetical necessity. 34 While the former can include fortune or chance, the latter is methodical and orderly.
Although Cudworth does not explicitly rank these different forms of atheism, there is a sense in which he is far more upset by the Stoic and Stratonic forms. While Democritical and Anaximandrian atheists may appear to be more thoroughgoing in so far as they deny the existence of any principle of life within their dead matter, making both life and consciousness emergent properties, Cudworth qua Cartesian sees this mechanical view of nature as the natural complement of theism, to the extent that this dead matter requires transcendent intervention to account for its motion. Stoic and Stratonic atheism, by contrast, have no need for a first cause, for they have their own immanent principle of movement.
Cudworth is by no means concerned by the fact he has so many different forms of atheism with which to contend. On the contrary, he is delighted that 'the kingdom of darkness [is] divided, or labouring with an intestine seditious war in its own bowels, and thereby destroying itself'. 35 The contradictory arguments put forward by each type of atheist may be redeployed against the other types so that they refute one another. Thus, 'atheism is a certain strange kind of monster, with four heads, that are all of them perpetually biting, tearing, and devouring one another'.
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Cudworth's taxonomy of philosophical positions does not end here, however. He goes on to suggest that each of these forms of atheism has a theistic counterpart. Atomical atheism but also Atomical theism (his own position), and so on for the other types of atheism. Indeed, Cudworth goes on to suggest that atomism has a natural association with what he calls 'incorporeism', a natural association violently broken by Democritus, the first Atomical atheist. Before Democritus, atomism existed in its authentic form as a type of theism. 37 The same applies to each of the four types of atheism, which are also held to be corruptions of an earlier, authentic type of theism. 38 Atheism, for Cudworth, is always a degeneration or corruption.
STOIC THEISM AND ATHEISM
After this lengthy, but necessary, account of Cudworth's wider project, we are now in a position to turn to his account of Stoicism. We have seen that Stoicism forms one of the four principal types of atheism and we should now expect Cudworth to argue that there is a corresponding form of theism -Stoical theism -and that this theism is the authentic and uncorrupted version of the doctrine. He does not dissapoint on either front.
For Cudworth, Stoicism is one of the archetypal forms of atheism and yet this is also a corruption of a purer and earlier Stoic doctrine. He suggests that the founder of Stoicism, Zeno of Citium (but also Heraclitus, often cited as a source for Stoic physics and Hippasus of Metapontus, an obscure heterodox Pythagorean), thought the world to be an animal with a sentient and rational nature. As such, he suggests that Zeno and the 'most ancient Stoicks' were not atheists at all, this being a later degeneracy from the original Stoic doctrine. 39 Zeno, the founder of Stoicism, was not an atheist; rather, he was a 'corporeal theist', albeit an 'ignorant, childish, and unskilful theist': world to be an animal.' 41 Even though Zeno asserts that only bodies exist and that the whole of Nature is nothing but matter, if it is also an animal with sentient or rational life, then he should not be counted among the atheists. Instead, Cudworth calls his position one of corporeal cosmozoism, an example of corporeal theism, which is of course from Cudworth's Christian perspective a type of spurious theism. 42 However, if Zeno had claimed that the whole of Nature was not conscious, then he would have been an atheist, claiming that:
The whole world is no animal, but as it were, one huge plant or vegetable, a body endued with one plastick or spermatick nature, branching out the whole, orderly and methodically, but without any understanding or sense. And this must needs be accounted a form of atheism, because it does not derive the original of things in the universe from any clearly intellectual principle or conscious nature. 43 Zeno did not claim this, though, and nor did a number of his immediate successors, the most significant of whom was Chrysippus. 44 Diogenes Laertius informs us that:
The doctrine that the cosmos is an animal, rational, animate, and intelligent, is laid down by Chrysippus in the first book of his treatise On Providence, by Apollodorus in his Physics, and by Posidonius. It is an animal in the sense of an animate substance endowed with sensation; for animal is better than nonanimal, and nothing is better than the cosmos, ergo the cosmos is an animal. And it is endowed with soul, as is clear from our several souls being each a fragment of it. 45 On Cudworth's own terms, the most important of the early Stoics are clearly not atheists. Their cosmos is rational, ensouled and intelligent (λογικὸν καὶ ἔμψυχον καὶ νοερὸν). If their god is an animal, as it seems to be, then the Stoics are theists. Only if their god has merely vegetative life without consciousness -only if the Stoic god is a mindless vegetable -should Stoicism be classed as a type of atheism.
So why did Cudworth associate one of his four principal types of atheism with Stoicism? Cudworth draws on two ancient pieces of evidence. The first is a passage from Seneca's Natural Questions in which Seneca appears to waver between the competing claims that the world is either an animal or a vegetable: 'Whether the world is an animal, or a body governed by nature, like trees and plants, there is incorporated in it from its beginning to its end everything it must do or undergo.' 46 Cudworth acknowledges that Seneca appears unwilling or unconcerned to choose between the two options, but this makes him all the more suspicious. He pushes this suspicion further by noting that some earlier scholars have also doubted whether Zeno really ever held the cosmos to be an animal, although he does not name them. 47 It should also be noted that Cudworth amends the text of Seneca in this passage: sive animal est mundus, 'whether the world is an animal', is Cudworth's own emendation of the text, which the manuscript traditon records as sive anima est mundus, 'whether the world is a soul'. Although this might look as if Cudworth is amending the text to fit his own concerns, in fact the contrast he wants to make is clear in both readings, and a number of subsequent editors of the Natural Questions have adopted Cudworth's reading. 48 Seneca's indecision, suspicious as it may look, is hardly grounds on its own to cast the Stoics as one of the archetypal groups of ancient atheists. Cudworth's second piece of evidence for Stoic atheism is more forthright. Earlier, we saw Diogenes Laertius report that a whole series of important Stoics, including Chrysippus, Apollodorus and Posidonius, all affirmed that the cosmos was indeed a rational, animate and intelligent animal. The next line of Diogenes's account adds that 'Boethus, however, denies that the cosmos is an animal'. 49 Boethus of Sidon was a relatively minor Stoic of the second century BC with heterodox views on a number of points of Stoic physical theory: he rejected the doctrine of periodic conflagration, posited the eternity and incorruptibility of the world, and denied that the world was an animal. 50 Cudworth, however, calls him an eminent and famous Stoical Doctor [who] did plainly deny the world to be an animal, that is, to have any sentient, conscious or intellectual nature presiding over it, and [who] consequently must needs make it to be but […] a body governed by a plastick or vegetative nature, as trees, plants and herbs. 51 Cudworth goes on to claim, with no real grounds at all, that other Stoics may well have made this claim before Boethus, and that 'it is very probable' that Boethus had many followers. It is certainly doubtful that any Stoics before Boethus made this claim, as Diogenes's report explicitly singles him out as the sole exponent of this heterodox view. Moreover, Cicero's account of Stoic theology in De Natura Deorum, written in 45 BC, makes no mention of Boethus and repeats the standard Stoic argument reported by Diogenes that if there is rational mind in humans, then there must surely be rational mind in Nature. 52 Among later Stoics, Epictetus certainly does not follow Boethus's lead and if anything goes the other way, embracing a more personalistic conception of god rather than reducing him to a mindless vegetable. 53 In Cudworth's defence, he does acknowledge that Boethus's position, like all forms of atheism, is a corruption of a once theistic world view and he labels this degenerate position 'pseudoStoical'. 54 Cudworth's objection to this pseudo-Stoical atheism is that it reduces consciousness to an emergent property. The ancient sources do not mention 'consciousness' of course (and in fact Cudworth may have coined the English word in this very discussion), but they do mention sensation (αἴσθησις, distinguishing animals from plants and vegetables) and reason (λόγος, distinguishing humans from other animals). What Cudworth insists on is that 'the sensitive souls of brute animals, and the rational souls of men, could never possibly emerge out of one single, plastick and vegetative soul in the whole universe'. 55 On this point he is in complete agreement with the early Stoics and, in particular, with a series of theological arguments made by Zeno and reported by Cicero: 'Nothing that is inanimate and irrational can give birth to an animate and rational being; but the world gives birth to animate and rational beings; therefore the world is animate and rational.' 56 Therefore, despite branding Stoicism as one of the four principal types of atheism, Cudworth's own position is in fact quite close to the orthodox Stoic view in rejecting the idea that sensation, intelligence or consciousness might be an emergent property. This is not, however, to suggest that Cudworth held any secret sympathy for Stoicism; it simply reflects his wider commitment to Platonism.
EPILOGUE
Cudworth's aim behind his complete taxonomy of forms of atheism was not merely antiquarian. As we have already seen, his principal goal was to undermine contemporary forms of atheism, with Hobbes and Spinoza being the most likely targets. 57 While Hobbes attracted a number of polemics, 58 and Hobbes and Spinoza were sometimes attacked together (by, among others, Samuel Clarke in his A Demonstration of the Being and Attributes of God), it was Spinoza's alleged atheism that would prove to have most consequences for the reception of Stoicism in the period after the publication of the True Intellectual System.
What is striking about the reception of both Stoicism and Spinozism from the 1670s onwards is the way in which they are intertwined. 59 The first author to pursue this line of thought was Jakob Thomasius, who published works on Stoicism in 1676 and 1682, and whose greatest claim to fame would be to have taught, and then corresponded with, Leibniz. 60 It was developed by Johann Franz Buddeus who, in a book on Spinozism before Spinoza, claimed that the Stoics were, among all the Greek philosophers, the closest to Spinozism. 61 We see the same claim crop up in other authors of the period, such as Vico and Bayle. Vico, for instance, describes the Stoics as 'the Spinozists of their day'. 62 The same conjunction can be found later in the eighteenth century in the Encyclopédie: the article on Spinoza opens by contrasting Spinoza's philosophy with Epicurus and Strato before identifying it with Stoicism. The only significant difference between Stoicism and Spinozism, the article's author suggests, is Spinoza's rejection of providence. 63 Despite this later tradition of identifying Stoicism with both Spinozism and atheism one thing is hopefully clear, namely that while Stoicism may not be easily assimilated to Christianity, it is not straightforwardly a form of atheism either. Cudworth is the only author of this period to offer a thorough analysis of these issues with clear definitions and conditions for what it means to be a theist or an atheist. Despite the reputation as atheists that the Stoics acquired in the eighteenth century, Cudworth shows well before that tradition even became established that it is mistaken, even if he may have contributed to its development himself. According to his definitions of theism and atheism, the orthodox early Stoics remain theists, even if their theism is far from orthodox Christianity, because their god is sentient. For the orthodox Stoa, consciousness is not an emergent property, for that would imply that a part might have greater perfection than the whole, and nothing, they claim, can be better than the cosmos.
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